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At-will employment is both emblematic of, and an anomaly in,
American society. Stated most baldly, the doctrine asserts that,
unless a contract of hire has a fixed term, employers "may dismiss
their employees at will... for good cause, for no cause or even for
cause morally wrong."' This harsh rule may square well with the
* This Article is based on an address delivered at the "Eighth Annual National
Conference on Labor and Employment Law: Critical Issues for 1993" held January 22-23,
1993 in Tampa, Florida. The Stetson University College of Law Center for Dispute
Resolution presented the conference.
** James E. & Sarah A. Degan Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B.,
Fordham College, 1951; J.D., University of Michigan, 1954. Professor St. Antoine served
from 1987 through 1991 as reporter, or draftsperson, for the Drafting Committee on the
Uniform Employment Termination Act of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. The views expressed in this Article are the author's and do not
necessarily reflect those of the Conference, its officers, or the Drafting Committee.
1. Payne v. Western & A.R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884). See also HORACE
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rugged, self-centered individualism that social commentators from
de Tocqueville through Robert Bellah have identified as one dis-
tinctive feature of the national psyche.2 But it ill comports with
other equally prominent traits among Americans, such as their
open-handed generosity toward the less fortunate and their passion
for fairness in the treatment of all persons.8
The United States remains the last major industrial democracy
in the world that has not heeded the call of the International Labor
Organization for generalized legal protections against unjust dis-
missal.4 A few legal scholars have defended at-will employment on
such grounds as freedom of contract and management efficiency.5
The substantial majority, however, have concluded that those con-
cerns are outweighed by the demands of simple justice and a bal-
ancing of the various interests at stake.6 Individual workers lack
WOOD, LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 272-73 (1877).
2. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILL, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 477 (J. Mayer & M. Lerner
eds., 1966); ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART 142, 144-45, 150 (1985).
See also Frederick J. Turner, The Significance of the Frontier in American History, in
THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 1 (Frederick J. Turner ed., 1976); GUNNAR MYRDAL,
AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 17-18 (20th ann. ed. 1962).
3. There is no need to document the readiness of the United States to respond to
a natural disaster anywhere in the world. On the domestic scene, three decades of in-
creasingly expansive civil rights legislation testify to the concern about extirpating nearly
all forms of categorical or status-based discrimination from the workplace. See, e.g., the
Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988); the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1988); the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e (1988 & Supp. IH 1992); and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42
U.S.C. § 12101 (Supp. HI 1992).
4. Convention No. 158 Concerning Termination of Employment at the Initiative of
the Employer, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS 68th SESS.
xxxviii (1982). Some 60 nations prohibit the discharge of employees without cause, in-
cluding the European Community, Sweden, Norway, Japan, Canada, and others in South
America, Africa, and Asia. Committee Labor & Empl. Law, Ass'n Bar City N.Y., At-Will
Employment and the Problem of Unjust Dismissal, 36 THE RECORD 170, 175 (1981). At
present Montana is the only state with a statute forbidding dismissal without good
cause. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 (1987).
5. E.g., Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV.
947, 955, 966 (1984); Timothy J. Heinsz, The Assault on the Employment-at-Will Doc-
trine: Management Considerations, 48 Mo. L. REV. 855 (1983).
6. E.g., Benjamin Aaron, Constitutional Protections Against Unjust Dismissals from
Employment: Some Reflections, in NEW TECHNIQUES IN LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION 13
(Howard J. Anderson ed., 1982); Lawrence R. Blades, Employment-at-Will vs. Individual
Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404
(1967); Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers No More: All Workers Are Entitled to "Just
Cause" Protection Under Title VII, 2 INDUS. REL. L.J. 519 (1978); Jeffrey L. Harrison,
The 'New" Terminable-at-Will Employment Contract: An Interest and Cost Incidence Anal-
ysis, 69 IOWA L. REV. 327 (1984); Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employ.
180
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equal bargaining power in dealing with their employers. The termi-
nation of any single relationship means far more to the employee
than to the employer. The results can be devastating, and not just
economically. Numerous surveys attest to the increases in cardio-
vascular deaths, suicides, mental breakdowns, alcoholism, ulcers,
spouse and child abuse, and impaired social relations that follow
the loss of a job.7
Most companies undoubtedly strive to treat their workers fair-
ly. That is not only the decent thing to do; the expense of training
new recruits and the value of having experienced personnel also
make it a matter of good business. Nonetheless, petty antagonisms
can develop and faulty judgments can occur. A careful scholar has
estimated that two million of the sixty million at-will employees in
the country are dismissed annually and that "[albout 150,000 of
these workers would have been found to have been discharged
without just cause"' if they had the same job protections accorded
civil service personnel or nearly everyone in the unionized sector. In
terms of the number of people involved, the problem is an eminent-
ly practical and important one.
Employers, as well as employees, are likely to profit from im-
proved working conditions, including enhanced job security. Several
studies, both here and abroad, have shown a marked correlation
between guarantees of fair procedures in the workplace and high
productivity along with quality output.9 In light of these worldwide
industrial trends, the obsession in some quarters of American man-
agement with absolute autonomy in directing the work force ought
ment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 Omo ST. L.J. 1 (1979); Jack Stieber, The Case
for Protection of Unorganized Employees Against Unjust Discharge, in PROC. 32D ANN.
MEETING INDUS. REL. RES. ASS'N 155 (B. Dennis ed., 1980); Clyde W. Summers, Individ-
ual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976);
Symposium, Employment Rights, 67 NEB. L. REV. 1 (1988); Symposium, Individual
Rights in the Workplace: The Employment-at-Will Issue, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 199
(1983).
7. E.g., BARRY BLUESTONE & BENNET HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF
AmERICA 63-66 (1982), and authorities cited; Louis FERMAN & JEANNE GORDUS EDS.,
MENTAL HEALTH AND THE ECONOMY (1979).
8. Jack Stieber, Recent Developments in Employment-at-Will, 36 LAB. L.J. 557, 558
(1985).
9. Fred K. Foulkes, Large Nonunionized Employers, in U.S. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
1950-1980: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 129, 134-36, 141-44, 151-56 (Jack Stieber et al. eds.,
1981); RICHARD T. PASCALE & ANTHONY G. ATHOS, THE ART OF JAPANESE MANAGEMENT
131-57 (1981). Cf. SPECIAL TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE,
WORK IN AMERiCA 93-110, 188-201 (1973).
1993]
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not to prevail.
Over the last quarter century, the most significant development
in the field of labor and employment law has been a nationwide
movement toward a revision of the at-will employment doctrine.
Courts in over forty-five jurisdictions have used one or more of
three main theories to carve out exceptions to the previously all-
pervasive principle.0 Unfortunately, though one can applaud the
values embodied in these decisions, there are serious deficiencies in
the common law modifications. The purpose of this Article is to
outline those defects and to demonstrate that the interests of em-
ployees and employers alike would be better served by new remedi-
al legislation, such as the Model Employment Termination Act."
II. DEFECTS IN COMMON LAW MODIFICATIONS
A. Tort Theories
With a doctrine as well entrenched as at-will employment, only
a truly shocking case could jar the judiciary into a reexamination of
the doctrine's basic premises. That case was Petermann v. Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 396,12 where an employee
challenged his dismissal for refusing to commit perjury in order to
shield his employer from a legislative investigating committee. A
California Court of Appeal called the discharge "obnoxious" to the
interests of the state and sustained a cause of action on the
grounds it violated public policy.'3 Two decades later, in Tameny
v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,' 4 the California Supreme Court con-
firmed that such violations of public policy would support a tort
action in a case where an employee was fired for declining to partic-
ipate in an illegal price-fixing scheme. The practical importance of
denominating these discharges contrary to public policy as torts
was that it opened the way to punitive as well as compensatory
damages."5 Subsequently, other courts extended the public policy
10. 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 1 505:51 (July 1992); CHARLES G. BAKALY, JR. & JOEL
M. GROSSmN, THE MODERN LAW OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS (2d ed. 1992); WILLIAM
HOLLOWAY & MICHAEL LEECH, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION: RIGHTS AND REMEDIES (2d ed.
1993); HENRY PERREIT, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE (3d ed. 1992).
11. See infra notes 43-92 and accompanying text.
12. 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1959).
13. Id. at 27.
14. 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980).
15. See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988) (holding that
[Vol. XXII182
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exception beyond the situation where an employee suffers retalia-
tion for a refusal to engage in unlawful activity. Dismissals covered
included those resulting from the performance of a civic duty, such
as serving on a jury6 or "blowing the whistle" on company wrong-
doing,"7 and those resulting from the employee's exercise of a legal
right or privilege, such as filing a workers' compensation claim.'"
Not all courts, however, are prepared to enunciate public policy
concerning workers' dismissals, especially in the more amorphous
area of whistle-blowing, preferring to leave the issue for legislative
resolution. 9 Even the bolder innovators increasingly require that
the public policy relied upon be "well accepted" and "clearly articu-
lated," 0 or that it be "evidenced by a constitutional or statutory
provision. " " Accordingly, the public policy exception, or tort theo-
ry, is not available to most employees fired arbitrarily or without
good cause; only those rare few who are the victims of the most
blatantly outrageous treatment have viable claims. After all, most
employers know that one does not discharge an employee for de-
clining to commit peijury or join an antitrust conspiracy.
B. Contract Theories
In Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan22 and
where an employer has a policy for or states that it will dismiss an employee only for
cause and refrain from arbitrary dismissal, the employer must abide by its policy or
statement).
16. Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975) (holding employers not liable for puni-
tive damages after dismissing employee for attending jury duty because they did not
know their conduct was improper).
17. See Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980), and
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ml1. 1981), for cases holding
that dismissal of an employer for whistle-blowing gives rise to a cause of action in tort.
18. See Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353 (III. 1978), and Firestone Textile
Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1983), for cases holding that allegations of wrong-
ful discharge for filing a workers compensation claim state a cause of action. Contra
Martin v. Tapley, 360 So. 2d 708 (Ala. 1978); Segal v. Arrow Indus. Corp., 364 So. 2d
89 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
19. See, e.g., Murphy v. American Home Prod. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983);
Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A-2d 174 (Pa. 1974).
20. See Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem. Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1034 (Ariz. 1985);
see also Clifford v. Cactus Drilling Corp., 353 N.W.2d 469, 474 (Mich. 1984) (Williams,
C.J., dissenting).
21. See Adler v. American Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464 (Md. 1981); Brockmeyer v.
Dunn & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 840 (Wis. 1983).
22. 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980).
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Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc.,23 decided in the early 1980s, the
highest courts of Michigan and New York joined the California
courts in modifying employment-at-will, this time on a contract
theory.' If an employer orally assures an employee of continuing
job security at the time of hiring, or declares in a personnel manual
that the company's policy is not to discharge except for "just cause,"
that statement may constitute an express or implied contract,
which will be legally enforceable.25 With Toussaint, Weiner, and
the California decisions in the vanguard, the vast majority of
American jurisdictions followed suit during the ensuing decade in
modifying at-will employment, usually on both contract and public
policy grounds."
Despite the broader applicability of contract theory as contrast-
ed with tort theory, an employer obviously may still refrain from
any commitment concerning continuing employment. Unequivocal
language in a job application that any resulting employment will be
only at-will, 1 or a clear and prominent disclaimer in an employee
handbook asserting that any policy statements are not legally bind-
ing,2" will ordinarily foreclose employee claims. Furthermore, even
if an employer has established a policy of just cause protections,
most courts permit a unilateral revocation as long as the affected
workers receive adequate notice in advance. 9
Therefore, even the most widely available exception to at-will
employment, the contract action, is something of a will-o'-the-wisp;
it is available only as long as an employer allows it. At least one
early proponent, Michigan, has also cut back on the contract theory
through restrictive qualifications.3" An oral assurance, for exam-
23. 443 N.E.2d 441 (N.Y. 1982).
24. California adopted a contract theory in Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal.
Rptr. 917 (1981).
25. See supra note 15 for a California case outlining this theory.
26. See supra note 10.
27. See Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453 (6th Cir. 1986); French v.
Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 686 S.W.2d 435 (Ark. 1985).
28. See Woolley v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1260, modified on other
grounds, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081
(Wash. 1984).
29. See In re Certified Question (Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting Co.), 443 N.W.2d
112 (Mich. 1989). Cf. Enis v. Continental Ill. Natl Bank & Trust Co., 795 F.2d 39, 41
(7th Cir. 1986).
30. Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 473 N.W.2d 268, 275 (Mich. 1991) (holding
in a 4-2 decision that the statement "as long as they generated sales ... they had a
job" not sufficient to rebut at-will employment).
[Vol. XXII184
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ple, must generally be the product of actual bargaining to be legally
effective."' Finally, as a practical matter, only the more enlight-
ened business firms are likely to adopt a just cause discharge poli-
cy, and only professional or higher ranking managerial personnel
are likely to receive individualized guarantees. The rank and file
worker in the marginal plant or shop, who probably most needs
protection, is the least likely to acquire contract rights.
C. Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Potentially the most expansive common law safeguard for em-
ployees is the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. But only
about a dozen states have recognized this doctrine.32 One of the
most important of these, California, sharply limited the impact of
the covenant by reclassifying an action based on it as contractual
rather than tortious, thereby blocking access to punitive damag-
es."3 On the merits, the decision of the New York Court of Appeals
in Murphy v. American Home Products Corporation34 seems cor-
rect in insisting that extension of the covenant to wrongful dis-
charge would not be merely an exception to at-will employment but
rather a rejection of the whole doctrine.3 Historically, the cove-
nant has not served as a universal protection against every kind of
arbitrary behavior in a contractual relationship, such as unjust
dismissal, but instead as a specific assurance that neither party to
the contract will interfere with the other party's performance or its
enjoyment of the fruits of the agreement.3 6 Most courts will proba-
bly emulate New York and refrain from so daring a step as an
outright repeal of employment-at-will under the aegis of the cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing.
31. Id.
32. 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 1 505:51 (July 1992). E.g., Buysse v. Paine, Webber,
Jackson & Curtis', Inc., 623 F.2d 1244 (8th Cir. 1980) (applying Minnesota law); Fortune
v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977); Crenshaw v. Bozeman
Deaconess Hosp., 693 P.2d 487 (Mont. 1984).
33. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988) (asserting that only
three courts outside California have granted tort damages for breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing).
34. 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983).
35. Id. at 91 (holding no implied obligation of good faith regarding termination
exists in at-will employment contracts).
36. See 3 ARTHUR CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 570-71 (1960); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
1993] 185
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D. Summing Up the Common Law Modifications
The recent common law modifications of at-will employment
will not meet the needs of most employees. The public policy tort
exception reaches only a few extreme cases and the good faith cove-
nant applies in only a handful of states. Contract theories are sub-
ject to employer disavowals. In all instances, the successful plaintiff
will usually be a professional or upper-level managerial type. Ordi-
narily, rank and file workers who lose their jobs will not have a
sufficient dollar claim to attract the attention of a lawyer looking
for a sizable contingent fee.
At the same time, financial devastation can befall the hapless
employer that does get ensnared in a common law wrongful dis-
charge suit. Several studies of California cases found that a plain-
tiff who reached a jury won almost seventy-five percent of the time,
with the average verdict around $450,000. 37 Jury generosity is not
confined to California. Across the country, plaintiffs have received
awards of compensatory and punitive damages in such amounts as
$20 million, $4.7 million, $3.25 million, $2.57 million, $2 million,
$1.5 million, $1.19 million, and $1 million.3" Company attorneys in
Chicago, Cleveland, and Detroit have stated that even the success-
ful defense of a discharge case before a jury can cost between
$100,000 and $150,000, while their counterparts on the coasts said
that figure can reach $200,000.31 In addition, a recent RAND4"
study indicates that the hidden costs incurred by American busi-
nesses in trying to avoid this onerous litigation, including the cre-
ation of elaborate personnel procedures and the retention of unde-
sirable employees, may add up to one hundred times more than the
adverse judgments and other legal expenses.4'
37. JAMES N. DERTOUZOS, ET AL., THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF
WRONGFUL TERMINATION 34-26, 33-37 (1988); Cliff Palefsky, Wrongful Termination Litiga-
tion: Dagwood and Goliath, 62 MICH. B.J. 776 (1983); Discharge Verdicts Average
$424,527 in California, 1 Indiv. Empl. Rts. (BNA) No. 14, at 3 (Mar. 3, 1987).
38. Kenneth Lopatka & Julia Martin, Developments in the Law of Wrongful Dis-
charge, in ABA NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON LITIGATING WRONGFUL DISCHARGE AND INVASION
OF PRIVACY CLAIMS vii, 13-18 (1986).
39. Conversations between author and management lawyers at 1992 midwinter
meeting of the ABA Labor Law Section Committee on Individual Rights and Responsi-
bilities in the Workplace on April 8-9, 1992, at Silverado, California.
40. RAND is a private, non-profit institution which seeks to improve public policy
through research and analysis. RAND stands for Research and Development.
41. JAMES N. DERTOUZOS & LYNN A. KAROLY, LABOR MARKET RESPONSES TO Em-
[Vol. MII186
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To summarize, in the existing common law system employees'
substantive rights are too limited and unpredictable, the remedies
against employers are too haphazard and often excessive, and for
everyone the procedure in the civil courts is too slow, costly, and
cumbersome.
III. THE MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT
A. Overview and Prospects
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws approved the Model Employment Termination Act (META)42
at its annual meeting in August 1991 and recommended enactment
of the proposed Act by all fifty states.' The final vote of the Uni-
form Law Commissioners (ULC) on any measure up for adoption is
by state delegations. There were thirty-nine jurisdictions in favor of
META and only eleven opposed." These numbers alone testify to
the Act's merits and its increasing appeal to a group of intelligent
evaluators who are prepared to spend the time becoming educated
about all its features.
The ULC are a national cross-section of influential members of
the legal profession, mostly lawyers and judges, with a sprinkling of
law professors and state legislators. Each state delegation averages
about six persons. They tend to represent mainstream attitudes,
not extremist views. Bills are prepared by committees that meet
two or three times a year for intensive two-and-a-half day drafting
sessions. The ULC do not adopt bills unless they have been read
line by line at least twice at different annual conferences. More
controversial proposals, like META, may take three or more read-
ings. Significantly, before its very first reading was completed,
META had to survive an almost unprecedented motion to discharge
its drafting committee on the grounds the whole enterprise was a
futility and a waste of the Commissioners' time. META's subse-
quent overwhelming approval speaks volumes about the reaction a
fuller acquaintance with it generated in an initially skeptical but
open-minded and perceptive audience.
The META drafting committee consisted of eleven members,
PLOYER LIABILITY xii, 36-40 (1992).
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with the author as "reporter," or principal draftsperson. Drafting
committees are traditionally composed of generalists, with no axes
to grind. Specialized expertise is supplied by the reporters and by
outside advisors. The META drafting committee received extremely
valuable input from representatives of the American Bar
Association's Labor and Employment Law Section and its Tort and
Insurance Practice Section, the AFL-CIO, the United States Cham-
ber of Commerce, the National Employment Lawyers Association,
the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Trial Lawyers
Association, the American Arbitration Association, the National
Academy of Arbitrators, and various other groups and individuals.
META was ultimately designated as a model act rather than a
uniform act. That means that the ULC considered uniformity a
"desirable" but not a "principal" objective, with the Act's purposes
being achievable without its adoption "in its entirety by every state"
and "without the same emphasis on adhering to the verbatim
text.-45
The essence of the Model Act is compromise, not as a matter of
political expediency but as a practical, balanced accommodation of
the competing worthy interests of employers and employees. Work-
ers are entitled to be free from arbitrary treatment; business is
entitled to be free from unnecessary costs. META promotes both
objectives. The proposed Act guarantees the vast majority of em-
ployees certain irreducible minimum rights against wrongful dis-
charge but substantially reduces the potential liability of em-
ployers.46 META substitutes the use of professional arbitrators in
place of long, expensive court proceedings as the preferred method
of enforcement.47 That substitution also eliminates wayward ver-
dicts by emotional juries.
To date, META, or bills drawing upon it have been introduced
in approximately ten state legislatures.48 It would be folly to think
that passage will be quick or easy anywhere. By definition, the
45. Statement of Policy Establishing Criteria and Procedures for Designation and
Consideration of Acts §§ 4(6)(b), 7 (Aug. 2, 1988), in NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMIS-
SIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 1991-1992 REFERENCE BooK, 111-12, 113 (1991).
46. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
48. E.g., Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire,
and Oklahoma, and to a lesser extent, New York and Pennsylvania. This information
was provided by the ULC headquarters in Chicago and by Professor Stuart Henry of
Eastern Michigan University, Ypsilanti, Michigan.
[Vol. XXII
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constituency most keenly affected consists of unorganized workers.
The AFL-CIO's Executive Council has officially endorsed the princi-
ple of a statutory prohibition of discharges without cause,49 but it
has not embraced META as the solution. Although some legal coun-
sel for management privately applaud the proposal as a fair com-
promise, one cannot expect widespread support from the business
community. Many employers remain confident that the lightning of
costly lawsuits will strike someone else, and that such precautions
as the purging of "just cause" policy statements from personnel
manuals will ward off most heavy blows. Plaintiffs' lawyers, ironi-
cally, are among the strongest opponents of META. Some undoubt-
edly are influenced by what they sincerely believe are disadvantag-
es for workers, such as the loss of punitive and general compensato-
ry damages. 0 Some are probably influenced by fears of losing the
large contingent fees they now derive from a few successful upper-
middle-class claimants. If opposing political pressures are not sim-
ply too great, the legislatures should eventually be moved by the
same informed sense of justice that led the Uniform Law Commis-
sioners over the course of three years to see the rightness in the
balance struck by META.
B. The Standard of Good Cause
META prohibits the termination of covered employees except
for "good cause."51 Good cause could consist of either misconduct
or poor performance by an individual worker, or the economic needs
and goals of the enterprise as determined by management in the
good faith exercise of business judgment.52 The drafters chose the
term "good cause," rather than the more common "just cause" ap-
pearing in collective bargaining agreements, to emphasize the eco-
nomic flexibility afforded the employer. No difference in meaning
was intended. The official comments direct interpreters of the stat-
ute to heed the arbitral precedent developed over the past half
century, so the cryptic language has already been defined and
fleshed out in thousands of published decisions.53
49. 1 Indiv. Empl. Rts. (BNA) No. 14, at 1 (Mar. 3, 1987).
50. Paul H. Tobias, Defects in the Model Employment Termination Act, 43 LAB. L.J.
500 (Aug. 1992).
51. Model Employment Termination Act [hereinafter META] §§ 1(4), 3(a) (1991).
52. Id. § 1(4).
53. META § 1(4) cmt.
1993]
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Some of the listed examples of good cause for a termination in
an individual case are theft, fighting on the job, destruction of prop-
erty, drug or alcohol use at work, insubordination, excessive absen-
teeism, and inadequate performance.' Off-duty conduct is includ-
ed if it is relevant to the employee's job performance or the
employer's business reputation.5 An objective standard applies,
with the arbitrator or other factfinder making the ultimate determi-
nation. Distinguished management counsel among the drafting
committee's advisors favored the "good cause" criterion over a sub-
jective standard like "good faith and reasonable belief," primarily on
the grounds that the more objective term ensured greater predict-
ability because of its long arbitral history.
Unlike decisions concerning the dismissal of a particular indi-
vidual, economic decisions leading to layoffs or other terminations
are largely subjective. Good faith is the only limitation on an
employer's business judgment. Management is entirely free to de-
termine the scope of the enterprise, the size of the work force, the
location of plants, and all other similar questions. Of course an
employer could not concoct a sham layoff to rid itself of an employ-
ee when good cause for a termination was lacking, because that
would violate the requirement of a good faith business judgment.
Employers may also set the standards of performance for given
positions in their establishments at the highest levels they de-
sire.56 The only restriction is that particular individuals may not
be prejudiced by a deliberate skewing of standards.57 In intensely
competitive occupations, like professional sports, law practice, or
the entertainment industry, a performance standard could call for
the most proficient performer available for a specific post.
C. Coverage
META covers most full-time employees (those working 20 or
more hours a week) after one year of service with an employer.58
Small employers (those with less than five employees) are ex-
cepted.59 These small employers may well be responsible for some
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. META § 1(4) and cmt.
57. META § 1(4) cmt.
58. Id. §§ 1(1), 3(b).
59. Id. § 1(2).
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of the most arbitrary treatment found in the workplace. Nonethe-
less, the drafters considered intervention in situations where there
are extremely intimate and potentially hostile personal relation-
ships to be imprudent and a misallocation of resources. Initially,
this author proposed excluding high-ranking policymaking execu-
tives, because he felt that at some level policy judgments and stan-
dards of good cause became too interwoven for an outsider to sort
out, and that in any event the Lee Iacoccas of the world could fend
for themselves. Management advisors objected. A trade-off for pro-
tection under META resulted in the elimination of common law tort
and implied contract actions based on prohibited terminations.
Naturally, well paid corporate officials are most likely to have the
biggest claims. Thus, the Act in its final form protects even corpora-
tion presidents, but denies them tort and implied contract suits.
Workers subject to union contracts are covered by META to the
extent permitted by federal preemption law.60 In light of the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court's deference to state law dealing with em-
ployment discrimination, "minimum labor standards," and worker wel-
fare generally,6 preemption of good cause protections would ap-
pear unlikely merely because employees were unionized. For em-
ployees actually covered by collective bargaining agreements, how-
ever, the Court's current fixation on the need for interpreting the
labor contract as the touchstone of preemption under the Labor
Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act 62 could raise problems
about their resort to state law protections.6 It seems anomalous
that a union member could lose a state "good cause" claim merely
because a court might have to look to the collective agreement to
rule on an employer's argument that the union had waived the
employee's right to sue by substituting a right to arbitrate.' Logi-
cally, one would believe the contrary to be true, namely, that seri-
60. META §§ 2(d) and (e) cmt.
61. E.g., Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988); Metropol-
itan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985); New York Tel. Co. v. New
York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519 (1979); Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v.
Continental Air Lines, 372 U.S. 714 (1963). But cf. Barnes v. Stone Container Corp., 942
F.2d 689 (9th Cir. 1991).
62. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988).
63. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
64. See generally Michael C. Harper, Limiting Section 301 Preemption: Three Cheers
for the Trilogy, Only One for Lingle and Lueck, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 685, 706-13
(1990); Thomas Bean, Note, NLRA Preemption of State Law Actions for Wrongful Dis-
charge in Violation of Public Policy, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 441 (1986).
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ous constitutional questions would arise if states deprived employ-
ees of certain minimum labor guarantees because they had orga-
nized and engaged in collective bargaining. The inclusion of public
employees under META is left to state option.65
D. Preemption of Common Law
A major trade-off in META, as indicated earlier, is the preemp-
tion or extinguishment of most common law actions based on termi-
nations prohibited by the Act.66 Those actions include implied con-
tract claims and all tort claims, such as defamation and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.6 There is no displacement of
rights or claims under express contracts (e.g., fixed-term agree-
ments and "golden parachutes"68) or under statutes or administra-
tive regulations, like those dealing with job discrimination, "whis-
tle-blowing," and occupational health and safety concerns.69
Suits may still be brought for independent torts such as as-
sault, malicious prosecution, and false imprisonment, if there are
facts separate and apart from the termination itself to ground such
causes of action. 0 The key to the abolition of a tort claim is not
the nature of the tort, but whether its basis is the termination itself
or acts taken or statements made that are reasonably necessary to
initiate or effect the termination. The converse of this is that work-
ers who are not entitled to the good cause protections of the statute
retain the whole body of their common law rights and remedies."'
The Act does not affect an employer's report of a termination or
its grounds to another prospective employer." Such a communica-
tion continues to be governed by the existing tort law of the state,
including presumably the generally applicable doctrine of qualified
privilege. Finally, the preemption provision applies only to employ-
ee suits against an employer or its representatives and does not
touch employer suits against an employee, such as suits for disloy-
65. META § 1(2) and cmt.
66. See supra notes 12-36 and accompanying text.
67. META § 2(c) & (e).
68. Id. § 2(e) and cmt.
69. Id. § 2(d) & (e) cmt.
70. Id. § 2(c) and cmt.
71. Id. § 2(d).
72. META § 2(c) cmt.
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alty, breach of a covenant not to compete, and theft or destruction
of property.73
E. Remedies
Remedies under META are limited to those provided by the
federal Civil Rights Act of 196474 as originally adopted, namely,
reinstatement with or without back pay and attorneys' fees for a
prevailing party.75 Severance pay is allowable when reinstatement
is impracticable, up to a maximum of thirty-six months' pay in the
most egregious cases. 76 Compensatory and punitive damages are
expressly excluded.77
Employees' representatives complain that META's remedies are
inadequate, and employers' representatives complain that they are
excessive. This mutual dissatisfaction suggests that the remedies
probably are just about right. The primary objective should be to
return wrongfully discharged employees to their old jobs if feasible.
Large monetary awards may punish the employer, without benefit-
ing the employee as much over time as would a productive use of
acquired skills in a familiar setting. Of course, when the intensity
of personal feelings or other factors rule out reinstatement, the
arbitrator should have sufficient discretion to fashion a suitable
severance payment. META seeks to apply a principle of "proportion-
ality" to the remedial process. The maximum three years' severance
pay would not automatically be granted even if it were foreseeable
that a fired worker would be unemployed for three years or longer.
Instead, the circumstances of hiring, the length and quality of ser-
vice, and the gravity of the wrong perpetrated in the dismissal, as
well as the employee's probable loss, would be taken into ac-
count.78
Attorneys' fees are awarded to a prevailing party in accordance
with federal civil rights law standards.79 This seems essential if
employees are to obtain adequate legal representation in pursuing
73. Id.
74. 78 Stat. 253 (1964).
75. META § 7(b).
76. Id. § 7(b)(3).
77. Id. § 7(d).
78. Id. § 7(b)(3) cmt.
79. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978) and Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) for examples of awards of attorneys' fees in
civil rights cases.
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their claims. For impoverished rank and file workers, the amount of
any likely recovery will seldom, if ever, be enough to attract capable
counsel who must rely on a contingent fee.
F. Enforcement Procedures
META offers three options for its enforcement. The preferred
method is the use of professional arbitrators appointed by an appro-
priate state agency.8 ° Arbitrators have the skill, understanding,
and experience to appreciate the special problems of the workplace.
Thus, they should be more acceptable to employers and employees
alike. Their efficiency in resolving industrial disputes should also
reduce the time and expense of proceedings. Another advantage of
ad hoc arbitrators would be the avoidance of a new permanent staff
of civil servants.
One departure from arbitral practice in the unionized sector is
that the burden of proof under META rests on a complainant em-
ployee.8' The drafters here accepted the usual rule of the civil
courts. But, because the drafters recognized that the employer
knows best the exact reasons for the termination, the employer
must ordinarily proceed first to present its case. Apropos of this,
many arbitrators will vigorously maintain that the burden of proof
means little or nothing in arbitral decisionmaking. Although possi-
bly overstated, this author agrees that the importance of proof
burdens in labor arbitrations can easily be exaggerated.
META limits judicial review of arbitral awards to such grounds
as fraud and corruption, an abuse of authority by the arbitrator, or
a prejudicial error of law.8 2 Even so, that is a broader scope of re-
view than governs arbitrations under collective bargaining agree-
ments.8 The latter instances do not cover error of law. The Su-
preme Court's limit on judicial review of contractual arbitrations is
based on the notion that unions and employers have agreed to treat
80. META § 6.
81. Id. § 6(e).
82. Id. § 8(c).
83. See Paperworkers Intl Union, AFL-CIO v. lisco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 37-38
(1987) and United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
597-98 (1960), where the Supreme Court discusses an arbitrator's fraud, dishonesty, or
infidelity to the commission to draw the "essence" of the award from the collective bar-
gaining agreement as grounds for setting aside the award. Awards are not to be re-
versed simply because of "factual or legal error." Paperworkers, 484 U.S. at 38. Of course
an illegal contract or illegal award will not be enforced.
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arbitral awards as "final and binding," and that the parties' own
contract is applied by the arbitrator.8 When individual statutory
rights are at stake, the Court has declined to give the same weight
even to the awards of arbitrators operating under union-manage-
ment agreements.85 In META, individual statutory rights are the
issue, and arbitration as the enforcement mechanism has been
imposed upon the parties, not agreed to by them. For these reasons,
an arbitrator's "prejudicial error of law" is added as a ground for
judicial review. Unless a legal error adversely affects the rights of a
party, however, a court should not vacate an award.
Instead of using arbitrators on an ad hoc basis, some states
may believe that it would be less expensive to employ full-time civil
service or other government personnel as hearing officers. An alter-
nate provision in META authorizes such staffing.86 A third option
would place enforcement in the hands of the civil courts." That
would almost surely be the most costly, complex, and time consum-
ing procedure. Nonetheless, a few states may believe that their con-
stitutional guarantees of right to jury trial, access to the courts for
the redress of wrongs, and other procedures preclude the substitu-
tion of other forums. This author believes that only one or two
states might be so inhibited.
G. Costs
As a matter of principle, the proposed new right to be free from
unjust dismissal, like any other right of the citizenry, should be
enforced by a publicly funded tribunal. Most states are currently in
dire financial straits, however, and the prospect of an additional
fiscal burden of uncertain dimensions could be fatal for a measure
that is going to spark heated controversy. The META drafters ac-
cordingly suggest, as an alternative to the normal nominal filing
fee, that the states consider imposing a substantial part of the cost
on the parties themselves.88 A local arbitrator's fee and expenses
should be in the range of $1200-$1800.89 If other administrative
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981);
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
86. META Appendix, Alternative A.
87. Id., Alternative B.
88. META § 5(e) and cmt.
89. A common per diem fee for arbitrators today is $600. Hearings in discharge
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costs are included and the total shared equally, each party would
have to pay about $700-$1100. Perhaps it would be equitable to cap
the employee's portion in the amount of one or two weeks' pre-ter-
mination pay. Another possibility would be for a state to impose a
special "employment termination tax" on businesses covered by the
Act, using an experience rating similar to that applicable to unem-
ployment insurance.
H. Waivers
The spirit of compromise and the seductive appeal of "freedom
of contract" combined to produce some of the most debatable provi-
sions in META. Under certain conditions, employers and employees
may waive or "opt out" of the prescribed statutory rights and proce-
dures. By express written agreement, for instance, the parties may
dispense with the good cause protections and substitute a mandato-
ry severance payment of at least one month's pay for each year of
employment up to thirty months' pay.0 Similarly, the parties may
agree on a private arbitration procedure to resolve their dispute."
Freedom of contract is a prized element of Anglo-American law.
The waiver of statutory rights in the employment context, however,
has long been eyed suspiciously by labor theorists. Most workers
applying for a job have so little bargaining power that they will
sign any form an employer puts in front of them. Fortunately, well
recognized theories, such as economic duress and contracts of adhe-
sion, may enable the courts to curb the grosser forms of overreach-
ing. Furthermore, the rather generous severance pay schedule and
other technical features of that provision will tend to confine its use
to higher-ranking managerial personnel. Thus, the definition of a
"termination" under the Act includes a layoff of more than two
months.92 Severance payments under a valid "buyout" agreement
must be granted if there is a termination for any reason (including
what would otherwise be good cause) except an employee's willful
misconduct. Therefore, an employer would be taking the risk that
cases usually run 1 to 1 1/2 days, and the writing of the award takes another 1/2 to 2
days.
90. META § 4(c).
91. Id. § 4(i).
92. Id. § 1(8)(ii). A layoff resulting from economic conditions would be for good
cause, and consequently, an employee not covered by a buyout agreement would have no
basis for a claim.
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any employee subject to periodic layoffs who was out of work for
over two months could elect to treat the layoff as a termination and
secure the severance entitlement. In assessing any private arbitra-
tion system, the courts should also insist on strict adherence to due
process requirements before allowing the statutory procedures to be
displaced.
IV. CONCLUSION
META has its rough edges, as would any product emerging
from the clash of strongly contending forces. Its ultimate shape was
fashioned, however, not by partisans, but by persons whose highest
allegiance was to the ideal of a fair balance between the interests of
employers, employees, and the public. The Act's central tenet, that
a worker of demonstrated capacity should not be fired without good
cause, is a matter of elementary justice. The rest of the statute is a
" sophisticated scheme to effectuate this right in a manner that will
be reasonably swift, sure, and simple. Every other major democracy
in the industrial world has already written the underlying concept
into law. In the long run, a country as dedicated as is the United
States to the principle of justice for all can do no less.
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